Prevent attackers from exploiting redirect attack GetLinkMetadata API #4428
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CallMeMhz
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The previous fix for issue #4413 (commit #4421) still has some flaws. An attacker could potentially exploit a crafted redirection address to redirect to the internal network, thereby leveraging the GetLinkMetadata API to probe internal network information.