Escape user controlled input in prow.sh#307
Merged
Merged
Conversation
An attacker submitting a malicious Pull Request can execute arbitrary shell commands inside the CI runner container. The snapshot controller yaml from an untrusted pull request is read line by line, and the image: value is extracted into '$image' without any escaping or sanitization. This varible is then used directly ina double-quoted 'sed -e' command string, allowing the user to break out of the 's' command using ';' and execute arbitrary 'sed' extensions like 'e' (execute shell command). ```release-note Escape user-supplied image string in prow.sh ```
k8s-ci-robot
added
the
release-note
k8s-ci-robot
added
cncf-cla: yes
Contributor
|
/lgtm |
k8s-ci-robot
added
the
lgtm
Contributor
|
[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is APPROVED This pull-request has been approved by: mattcary, xing-yang The full list of commands accepted by this bot can be found here. The pull request process is described here DetailsNeeds approval from an approver in each of these files:
Approvers can indicate their approval by writing |
k8s-ci-robot
added
the
approved
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
3 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
An attacker submitting a malicious Pull Request can execute arbitrary shell commands inside the CI runner container.
The snapshot controller yaml from an untrusted pull request is read line by line, and the image: value is extracted into '$image' without any escaping or sanitization. This varible is then used directly ina double-quoted 'sed -e' command string, allowing the user to break out of the 's' command using ';' and execute arbitrary 'sed' extensions like 'e' (execute shell command).