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go1.12.8 (released 2019/08/13) includes security fixes to the net/http and net/url packages.
See the Go 1.12.8 milestone on our issue tracker for details:

https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.8

  • net/http: Denial of Service vulnerabilities in the HTTP/2 implementation
    net/http and golang.org/x/net/http2 servers that accept direct connections from untrusted
    clients could be remotely made to allocate an unlimited amount of memory, until the program
    crashes. Servers will now close connections if the send queue accumulates too many control
    messages.
    The issues are CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514, and Go issue golang.org/issue/33606.
    Thanks to Jonathan Looney from Netflix for discovering and reporting these issues.
    This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20190813141303-74dc4d7220e7 of golang.org/x/net/http2.
    net/url: parsing validation issue
  • url.Parse would accept URLs with malformed hosts, such that the Host field could have arbitrary
    suffixes that would appear in neither Hostname() nor Port(), allowing authorization bypasses
    in certain applications. Note that URLs with invalid, not numeric ports will now return an error
    from url.Parse.
    The issue is CVE-2019-14809 and Go issue golang.org/issue/29098.
    Thanks to Julian Hector and Nikolai Krein from Cure53, and Adi Cohen (adico.me) for discovering
    and reporting this issue.

go1.12.8 (released 2019/08/13) includes security fixes to the net/http and net/url packages.
See the Go 1.12.8 milestone on our issue tracker for details:

https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.8

- net/http: Denial of Service vulnerabilities in the HTTP/2 implementation
  net/http and golang.org/x/net/http2 servers that accept direct connections from untrusted
  clients could be remotely made to allocate an unlimited amount of memory, until the program
  crashes. Servers will now close connections if the send queue accumulates too many control
  messages.
  The issues are CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514, and Go issue golang.org/issue/33606.
  Thanks to Jonathan Looney from Netflix for discovering and reporting these issues.
  This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20190813141303-74dc4d7220e7 of golang.org/x/net/http2.
  net/url: parsing validation issue
- url.Parse would accept URLs with malformed hosts, such that the Host field could have arbitrary
  suffixes that would appear in neither Hostname() nor Port(), allowing authorization bypasses
  in certain applications. Note that URLs with invalid, not numeric ports will now return an error
  from url.Parse.
  The issue is CVE-2019-14809 and Go issue golang.org/issue/29098.
  Thanks to Julian Hector and Nikolai Krein from Cure53, and Adi Cohen (adico.me) for discovering
  and reporting this issue.

Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <[email protected]>
@thaJeztah
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waiting for Golang-cross image to become available on Docker Hub docker/golang-cross#36

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LGTM

👍

@thaJeztah
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Hm... do we have exactly the same test in the daemon and on the cli? moby/moby#39738 (comment)

Guess it's the opts package so 🤷‍♂

=== Failed
=== FAIL: opts TestParseDockerDaemonHost (0.00s)
    hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr 
    hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr 

=== FAIL: opts TestParseTCP (0.00s)
    hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr 
    hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr 

For now, just verifying that an error is returned, but not checking the
error message itself, because those are not under our control, and may
change with different Go versions.

```
=== Failed
=== FAIL: opts TestParseDockerDaemonHost (0.00s)
    hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
    hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr

=== FAIL: opts TestParseTCP (0.00s)
    hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
    hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
```

Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <[email protected]>
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merging this one

@thaJeztah thaJeztah merged commit 1412754 into docker:master Aug 14, 2019
@GordonTheTurtle GordonTheTurtle added this to the 19.09.0 milestone Aug 14, 2019
@thaJeztah thaJeztah deleted the bump_golang_1.12.8 branch August 14, 2019 15:53
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