chore(deps): update dependency undici to v5 [security] #111

renovate · 2022-06-18T18:55:37Z

Note: This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
undici (source)	`4.15.1` -> `5.29.0`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2022-32210

Description

Undici.ProxyAgent never verifies the remote server's certificate, and always exposes all request & response data to the proxy. This unexpectedly means that proxies can MitM all HTTPS traffic, and if the proxy's URL is HTTP then it also means that nominally HTTPS requests are actually sent via plain-text HTTP between Undici and the proxy server.

Impact

This affects all use of HTTPS via HTTP proxy using Undici.ProxyAgent with Undici or Node's global fetch. In this case, it removes all HTTPS security from all requests sent using Undici's ProxyAgent, allowing trivial MitM attacks by anybody on the network path between the client and the target server (local network users, your ISP, the proxy, the target server's ISP, etc).
This less seriously affects HTTPS via HTTPS proxies. When you send HTTPS via a proxy to a remote server, the proxy can freely view or modify all HTTPS traffic unexpectedly (but only the proxy).

Patches

This issue was patched in Undici v5.5.1.

Workarounds

At the time of writing, the only workaround is to not use ProxyAgent as a dispatcher for TLS Connections.

CVE-2022-31150

Impact

It is possible to inject CRLF sequences into request headers in Undici.

const undici = require('undici')

const response = undici.request("http://127.0.0.1:1000", {
  headers: {'a': "\r\nb"}
})

The same applies to path and method

Patches

Update to v5.8.0

Workarounds

Sanitize all HTTP headers from untrusted sources to eliminate \r\n.

References

https://hackerone.com/reports/409943
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12116

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in undici repository
To make a report, follow the SECURITY document

CVE-2022-31151

Impact

Authorization headers are already cleared on cross-origin redirect in
https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/lib/handler/redirect.js#L189, based on https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/872.

However, cookie headers which are sensitive headers and are official headers found in the spec, remain uncleared. There also has been active discussion of implementing a cookie store https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/1441, which suggests that there are active users using cookie headers in undici.
As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site.

Patches

This was patched in v5.8.0.

Workarounds

By default, this vulnerability is not exploitable.
Do not enable redirections, i.e. maxRedirections: 0 (the default).

References

https://hackerone.com/reports/1635514
https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2018-1000007.html
https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27776.html

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in undici repository
To make a report, follow the SECURITY document

CVE-2022-35949

Impact

undici is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in user input into the path/pathname option of undici.request.

If a user specifies a URL such as http://127.0.0.1 or //127.0.0.1

const undici = require("undici")
undici.request({origin: "http://example.com", pathname: "//127.0.0.1"})

Instead of processing the request as http://example.org//127.0.0.1 (or http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1 when http://127.0.0.1 is used), it actually processes the request as http://127.0.0.1/ and sends it to http://127.0.0.1.

If a developer passes in user input into path parameter of undici.request, it can result in an SSRF as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL.

Patches

This issue was fixed in [email protected].

Workarounds

The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the undici.request call.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in undici repository
To make a report, follow the SECURITY document

CVE-2022-35948

Impact

=< [email protected] users are vulnerable to CRLF Injection on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the content-type header.

Example:

import { request } from 'undici'

const unsanitizedContentTypeInput =  'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1'

await request('http://localhost:3000, {
    method: 'GET',
    headers: {
      'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput
    },
})

The above snippet will perform two requests in a single request API call:

http://localhost:3000/
http://localhost:3000/foo2

Patches

This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1

Workarounds

Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in undici repository
To make a report, follow the SECURITY document

CVE-2023-23936

Impact

undici library does not protect host HTTP header from CRLF injection vulnerabilities.

Patches

This issue was patched in Undici v5.19.1.

Workarounds

Sanitize the headers.host string before passing to undici.

References

Reported at https://hackerone.com/reports/1820955.

Credits

Thank you to Zhipeng Zhang (@timon8) for reporting this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-45143

Impact

Undici clears Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but does not clear Cookie headers. By design, cookie headers are forbidden request headers, disallowing them to be set in RequestInit.headers in browser environments. Since Undici handles headers more liberally than the specification, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and Undici's implementation of fetch.

As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site.

Patches

This was patched in e041de359221ebeae04c469e8aff4145764e6d76, which is included in version 5.26.2.

CVE-2024-24758

Impact

Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear Proxy-Authorization headers.

Patches

This is patched in v5.28.3 and v6.6.1

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds.

References

CVE-2024-30260

Impact

Undici cleared Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers for fetch(), but did not clear them for undici.request().

Patches

This has been patched in nodejs/undici@6805746.
Fixes has been released in v5.28.4 and v6.11.1.

Workarounds

use fetch() or disable maxRedirections.

References

Linzi Shang reported this.

CVE-2024-30261

Impact

If an attacker can alter the integrity option passed to fetch(), they can let fetch() accept requests as valid even if they have been tampered.

Patches

Fixed in nodejs/undici@d542b8c.
Fixes has been released in v5.28.4 and v6.11.1.

Workarounds

Ensure that integrity cannot be tampered with.

References

https://hackerone.com/reports/2377760

CVE-2025-22150

Impact

Undici fetch() uses Math.random() to choose the boundary for a multipart/form-data request. It is known that the output of Math.random() can be predicted if several of its generated values are known.

If there is a mechanism in an app that sends multipart requests to an attacker-controlled website, they can use this to leak the necessary values. Therefore, An attacker can tamper with the requests going to the backend APIs if certain conditions are met.

Patches

This is fixed in 5.28.5; 6.21.1; 7.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not issue multipart requests to attacker controlled servers.

References

CVE-2025-47279

Impact

Applications that use undici to implement a webhook-like system are vulnerable. If the attacker set up a server with an invalid certificate, and they can force the application to call the webhook repeatedly, then they can cause a memory leak.

Patches

This has been patched in https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/4088.

Workarounds

If a webhook fails, avoid keep calling it repeatedly.

References

Reported as: https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/3895

Release Notes

nodejs/undici (undici)

chore(deps): update dependency undici to v5 [security] #111

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