fix(security): prevent X-Forwarded-For IP spoofing#1265
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jwidan wants to merge 1 commit intoEqual-Vote:mainfrom
Open
fix(security): prevent X-Forwarded-For IP spoofing#1265jwidan wants to merge 1 commit intoEqual-Vote:mainfrom
jwidan wants to merge 1 commit intoEqual-Vote:mainfrom
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* Disables indiscriminately trusting all arbitrary client proxy headers * Trusts internal routing hops
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Description
This PR stops an IP spoofing vulnerability that let users forge their request origin and bypass the one vote per network setting. Before this PR, the backend indiscriminately trusted all proxy connections with
app.enable('trust proxy'). This let anyone inject arbitrary IP addresses into theirX-Forwarded-ForHTTP headers, tricking the backend into believing they were voting from a different IP.Because this application is hosted within Azure AKS, we will still trust
['loopback', 'linklocal', 'uniquelocal']private subnets. If there are more hops that go through external IPs, please let me know. While my previously successful spoofs no longer work with this PR when testing locally (taking loopback out), I'm not sure if this would work in production so please review :)