fix(dev): header host validation (#16043)

Author: ematipico

.changeset/full-pillows-greet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+'astro': patch
+---
+
+Fixes `checkOrigin` CSRF protection in `astro dev` behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy. The dev server now reads `X-Forwarded-Proto` (gated on `security.allowedDomains`, matching production behaviour) so the constructed request origin matches the `https://` origin the browser sends. Also ensures `security.allowedDomains` and `security.checkOrigin` are respected in dev.

packages/astro/src/core/app/node.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,11 @@ import { createOutgoingHttpHeaders } from './createOutgoingHttpHeaders.js';
 import type { RenderOptions } from './base.js';
 import { App } from './app.js';
 import type { NodeAppHeadersJson, SerializedSSRManifest, SSRManifest } from './types.js';
-import { validateForwardedHeaders, validateHost } from './validate-headers.js';
+import {
+	getFirstForwardedValue,
+	validateForwardedHeaders,
+	validateHost,
+} from './validate-headers.js';
 
 /**
  * Allow the request body to be explicitly overridden. For example, this
@@ -52,14 +56,6 @@ export function createRequest(
 
 	const isEncrypted = 'encrypted' in req.socket && req.socket.encrypted;
 
-	// Parses multiple header and returns first value if available.
-	const getFirstForwardedValue = (multiValueHeader?: string | string[]) => {
-		return multiValueHeader
-			?.toString()
-			?.split(',')
-			.map((e) => e.trim())?.[0];
-	};
-
 	const providedProtocol = isEncrypted ? 'https' : 'http';
 	const untrustedHostname = req.headers.host ?? req.headers[':authority'];
 

packages/astro/src/core/app/validate-headers.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
 import { matchPattern, type RemotePattern } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/remote';
 
+/**
+ * Parses a potentially comma-separated multi-value header (as produced by
+ * proxy chains) and returns the first value, trimmed of whitespace.
+ * Returns `undefined` when the header is absent or empty.
+ */
+export function getFirstForwardedValue(
+	multiValueHeader: string | string[] | undefined,
+): string | undefined {
+	return multiValueHeader
+		?.toString()
+		.split(',')
+		.map((e) => e.trim())[0];
+}
+
 /**
  * Sanitize a hostname by rejecting any with path separators.
  * Prevents path injection attacks. Invalid hostnames return undefined.

packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-app/app.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import type http from 'node:http';
 import { removeTrailingForwardSlash } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/path';
 import { BaseApp, type RenderErrorOptions } from '../core/app/entrypoints/index.js';
+import { getFirstForwardedValue, validateForwardedHeaders } from '../core/app/validate-headers.js';
 import { shouldAppendForwardSlash } from '../core/build/util.js';
 import { clientLocalsSymbol } from '../core/constants.js';
 import {
@@ -128,10 +129,27 @@ export class AstroServerApp extends BaseApp<RunnablePipeline> {
 		incomingResponse,
 		isHttps,
 	}: HandleRequest): Promise<void> {
-		const origin = `${isHttps ? 'https' : 'http'}://${
-			incomingRequest.headers[':authority'] ?? incomingRequest.headers.host
-		}`;
+		// When the dev server runs behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (e.g.
+		// Caddy, nginx, Traefik), the proxy connects to Vite over plain HTTP while
+		// the browser communicates over HTTPS. In that setup isHttps is false, but
+		// the proxy forwards the original scheme via X-Forwarded-Proto: https.
+		// We trust that header only when security.allowedDomains is configured —
+		// the same guard used in production (core/app/node.ts). Without it the
+		// header is untrusted and we fall back to isHttps.
+		const validated = validateForwardedHeaders(
+			getFirstForwardedValue(incomingRequest.headers['x-forwarded-proto']),
+			getFirstForwardedValue(incomingRequest.headers['x-forwarded-host']),
+			getFirstForwardedValue(incomingRequest.headers['x-forwarded-port']),
+			this.manifest.allowedDomains,
+		);
+
+		const protocol = validated.protocol ?? (isHttps ? 'https' : 'http');
+		const host =
+			validated.host ??
+			(incomingRequest.headers[':authority'] as string | undefined) ??
+			incomingRequest.headers.host;
 
+		const origin = `${protocol}://${host}`;
 		const url = new URL(origin + incomingRequest.url);
 		let pathname: string;
 		if (this.manifest.trailingSlash === 'never' && !incomingRequest.url) {

packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/plugin.ts

@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@ export async function createDevelopmentManifest(settings: AstroSettings): Promis
 		componentMetadata: new Map(),
 		inlinedScripts: new Map(),
 		i18n: i18nManifest,
-		checkOrigin:
-			(settings.config.security?.checkOrigin && settings.buildOutput === 'server') ?? false,
+		checkOrigin: settings.config.security?.checkOrigin ?? false,
+		allowedDomains: settings.config.security?.allowedDomains,
 		actionBodySizeLimit: settings.config.security?.actionBodySizeLimit
 			? settings.config.security.actionBodySizeLimit
 			: 1024 * 1024, // 1mb default

packages/astro/test/units/app/dev-url-construction.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+import * as assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
+import {
+	getFirstForwardedValue,
+	validateForwardedHeaders,
+} from '../../../dist/core/app/validate-headers.js';
+
+/**
+ * Mirrors the URL construction logic in AstroServerApp.handleRequest so that
+ * the protocol and host derivation can be exercised in isolation.
+ *
+ * @param {object} opts
+ * @param {Record<string, string>} opts.headers - Incoming request headers
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.isHttps=false] - Whether Vite itself is running TLS
+ * @param {import('../../../dist/core/app/types.js').SSRManifest['allowedDomains']} [opts.allowedDomains]
+ * @param {string} [opts.requestUrl='/']
+ * @returns {URL}
+ */
+function buildDevUrl({ headers, isHttps = false, allowedDomains, requestUrl = '/' }) {
+	const validated = validateForwardedHeaders(
+		getFirstForwardedValue(headers['x-forwarded-proto']),
+		getFirstForwardedValue(headers['x-forwarded-host']),
+		getFirstForwardedValue(headers['x-forwarded-port']),
+		allowedDomains,
+	);
+
+	const protocol = validated.protocol ?? (isHttps ? 'https' : 'http');
+	const host = validated.host ?? headers[':authority'] ?? headers['host'];
+
+	return new URL(`${protocol}://${host}${requestUrl}`);
+}
+
+describe('Dev server URL construction — X-Forwarded-Proto handling', () => {
+	it('uses http when isHttps=false and no allowedDomains configured (default)', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'localhost:4321' },
+			isHttps: false,
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+		assert.equal(url.origin, 'http://localhost:4321');
+	});
+
+	it('ignores X-Forwarded-Proto when allowedDomains is not configured', () => {
+		// Without allowedDomains the header must not be trusted — this is the
+		// security guard that prevents an attacker from forcing the scheme used
+		// in CSRF origin comparisons.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'localhost:4321', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+		assert.equal(url.origin, 'http://localhost:4321');
+	});
+
+	it('ignores X-Forwarded-Proto when allowedDomains is an empty array', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+	});
+
+	it('uses https from X-Forwarded-Proto when allowedDomains matches hostname', () => {
+		// Behind a TLS-terminating proxy (Caddy, nginx, Traefik) the browser
+		// sends Origin: https://host while the proxy connects to Vite over HTTP.
+		// With allowedDomains configured, the dev server derives the same
+		// https:// origin, so the CSRF Origin === url.origin comparison passes.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'https:');
+		assert.equal(url.origin, 'https://mre.local');
+	});
+
+	it('uses https from X-Forwarded-Proto with wildcard hostname pattern', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'app.example.com', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ protocol: 'https', hostname: '**.example.com' }],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'https:');
+		assert.equal(url.origin, 'https://app.example.com');
+	});
+
+	it('trusts X-Forwarded-Proto even when host does not match allowedDomains pattern', () => {
+		// validateForwardedHeaders validates protocol and host independently.
+		// When allowedDomains is non-empty but has no `protocol` property,
+		// any http/https value is accepted for the protocol. The host match is
+		// only required for the X-Forwarded-Host to be trusted; the fallback
+		// host header is used instead. This mirrors production (node.ts) behaviour.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'localhost:4321', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		// Protocol is trusted (allowedDomains is non-empty); host falls back to
+		// the Host header value.
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'https:');
+		assert.equal(url.origin, 'https://localhost:4321');
+	});
+
+	it('rejects X-Forwarded-Proto that does not match explicit protocol in allowedDomains', () => {
+		// When allowedDomains specifies a protocol, only that protocol is allowed.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'http' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ protocol: 'https', hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		// 'http' is rejected because the pattern requires 'https'
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+	});
+
+	it('falls back to isHttps=true when X-Forwarded-Proto is absent but Vite uses TLS', () => {
+		// When the user configures Vite's own TLS (vite.server.https) without a
+		// proxy, isHttps=true should still work.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'localhost:4321' },
+			isHttps: true,
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'https:');
+	});
+
+	it('uses first value from comma-separated X-Forwarded-Proto', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https,http' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'https:');
+	});
+
+	it('uses first value from comma-separated X-Forwarded-Proto with spaces', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': ' https , http' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'https:');
+	});
+
+	it('rejects malicious X-Forwarded-Proto with URL injection', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: {
+				host: 'mre.local',
+				'x-forwarded-proto': 'https://evil.com/?x=',
+			},
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		// validateForwardedHeaders rejects invalid protocol values
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+	});
+
+	it('rejects javascript: scheme injection in X-Forwarded-Proto', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: {
+				host: 'mre.local',
+				'x-forwarded-proto': 'javascript:alert(1)//',
+			},
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+	});
+
+	it('rejects empty X-Forwarded-Proto and falls back to isHttps', () => {
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': '' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		assert.equal(url.protocol, 'http:');
+	});
+
+	it('produces an origin that matches the browser Origin header when proxy is configured', () => {
+		// The CSRF check compares request.headers.origin === url.origin.
+		// When the dev server runs behind a TLS-terminating proxy and
+		// allowedDomains is configured, both sides of that comparison must
+		// resolve to the same https:// origin.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			allowedDomains: [{ hostname: 'mre.local' }],
+		});
+		const browserOriginHeader = 'https://mre.local';
+		assert.equal(url.origin, browserOriginHeader);
+	});
+
+	it('produces a mismatched origin behind a proxy when allowedDomains is not configured', () => {
+		// Without allowedDomains, X-Forwarded-Proto is untrusted and the URL
+		// gets an http:// origin while the browser sends Origin: https://.
+		// The CSRF check (Origin === url.origin) therefore returns false and
+		// blocks the request with 403.
+		const url = buildDevUrl({
+			headers: { host: 'mre.local', 'x-forwarded-proto': 'https' },
+			isHttps: false,
+			// no allowedDomains
+		});
+		const browserOriginHeader = 'https://mre.local';
+		assert.notEqual(url.origin, browserOriginHeader); // http:// vs https://
+	});
+});